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Abstract
Self-interested paid advisors should try to sell their solutions no matter how they
came about. However, we present evidence that advisor persuasiveness depends on
two dimensions of their prior problem solving: solution difficulty and demonstrability.
We report a laboratory experiment with repeated advisor-client interactions where
both these dimensions are independently varied. Persuasion rises in solution demon-
strability and falls in difficulty. The reason is non-optimising behaviour: Advisors
lacking in confidence fail to conceal difficult problem solving and those receiving their
advice baulk when the proposed solution lacks objective success criteria irrespective
of its promise. Our findings suggest differential prospects for persuasion and selling
of different kinds of products, services and ideas.
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1 Introduction
Good outcomes often entail the risk of relying on the decision making of
better-informed advisors who may be biased (Wolinsky, 1993; Emons, 1997;
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Dulleck and Kerschbamer, 2006; Chakraborty and Harbaugh, 2007, 2010). In
these situations, advisors first solve a decision problem and acquire private
information and then persuade their clients of the correctness of their solution
(e.g. Green and Stokey, 2007). These interactions are persuasion situations
because advisors have motive and opportunity to mislead those who require
their advice. Because of the ubiquity and importance of these kinds of situation,
the underlying persuasion process between information sender (advisor) and
receiver (client) is a central topic in different fields of social science.
We report the first experimental study of whether and how certain characteris-
tics of the sender’s decision problem affect the extent to which their advice is
accepted. We explore two ways in which advisor choices may vary. First, Laugh-
lin (1980) differentiates decision problem types along a spectrum of solution
demonstrability. On one end, intellective decision problems (e.g. mathematical
or lexical questions) have objectively appraisable solutions reached through
a series of steps while judgment problems (e.g. ethical or aesthetic questions)
typically lead to intuitive solutions which are harder to demonstrate to others.
Second, advisor decision problems differ in how easy or difficult the correct
solution is to determine (Pitchik and Schotter, 1987).
We examine whether and how the demonstrability and difficulty of decision
problems independently affect information transmission and persuasion between
sender and receiver. In standard theory, a rational and self-interested sender’s
advice should maximise her own payoffs irrespective of the nature of her
decision problem or private information (Chakraborty and Harbaugh, 2007,
2010) as long as her communication constitutes cheap talk, i.e. is costless and
unverifiable (Farrell and Rabin, 1996). However, in real settings, the nature
of the sender’s decision problem may affect persuasion through both sender
and receiver behaviour. For the sender, more difficult tasks may reduce her
confidence and, in turn, persuasion (e.g. Petty et al., 2002; Tenney et al.,
2008; Sah et al., 2013). One reason is psychological disutility (lying costs), and
another a pro-social regard for the receiver (Abeler et al., 2014; Lundquist
et al., 2009).
Receiver behaviour may also be affected by decision problem characteristics.
In real situations clients receiving advice are commonly aware of solution
demonstrability and may temper their responses accordingly. This is because
unlike difficulty, demonstrability is not a characteristic of a particular decision
problem but a decision problem type to which any given problem may or may
not belong. Low demonstrability requires greater trust by receivers to the
extent that senders are unable to evidence the correctness of their answers.
In our sender-receiver experiment we vary demonstrability and difficulty inde-
pendently and systematically and examine the effects on persuasion. The next
section develops our theoretical base and motivation which we then illustrate
using the example of venture capital (section 3). In section 4 we outline the
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experimental design, its implementation, followed by the variables we obtain
and research hypotheses. Results are contained in section 5. We conclude and
discuss policy implications in section 6.
2 Background
2.1 Persuasion
Interpersonal persuasion is voluntary change in attitudes or behaviour of
one individual that another intends through communication (Zimbardo and
Leippe, 1991, p. 127). Most empirical studies in social psychology have used an
experimental paradigm to measure attitude change in participants who receive
persuasive messages (Ajzen 2012, p. 384; O’Keefe 2002, p. 23; ch. 7). The causal
and moderating factors of attitude change identified in this literature include
the motives and characteristics of both sender and receiver (Petty et al., 1997;
Zimbardo and Leippe, 1991), of the content and medium of communication as
well as of the situation (Janis et al., 1959; Cialdini, 1988).
In contrast, the persuasion literature in economics focusses on overt behaviour.
A sender transmits private information relevant to a receiver’s decision which
determines both parties’ payoffs. The question is to what extent receivers
can glean useful information from a (rational) sender who communicates
strategically through cheap talk (Farrell and Rabin, 1996; Crawford, 1998; van
Winden, 1999). Studies have found that senders transmit more information than
is rational (Cai and Wang, 2006) potentially due to lying aversion (Sa´nchez-
Page´s and Vorsatz, 2007) or the use of heuristics (Wang et al., 2010).
In both psychology and economics sender private information is generally
perfect. However, in many realistic persuasion situations sender advice depends
on solving a prior decision problem. For example, Green and Stokey (2007) study
a two-person organisation where one is responsible for collecting information
and the other for making decisions on its basis while their interests diverge.
However there are no existing studies that examine how the nature of a sender’s
prior decision problem affects advice and its transmission.
2.2 Demonstrability
Laughlin and colleagues suggest that decision problems differ by the extent
to which the correctness of their solutions can be evidenced (Laughlin, 1980;
Laughlin and Ellis, 1986; Stasser and Stewart, 1992; Laughlin et al., 1995;
Laughlin and Hollingshead, 1995; Laughlin and Shupe, 1996; Laughlin, 1999).
Three factors contribute to solution demonstrability. One is the degree to
which alternative solutions can be compared using a definitive and objective
success criterion. The second is the extent to which the determination of
the best solution involves a series of logical steps of reasoning (e.g. forensic
evidence trails or clinical drug trials). The third factor is a shared conceptual
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(or epistemological) system within which both the solution success criterion
and reasoning steps are established.
Problems in science and engineering generally possess objective criteria for
solutions which can be arrived at through a series of steps within accepted
methodology. In contrast, decision problems involving ethical or aesthetic
judgments are examples of low solution demonstrability. Here the success of
a solution lies in the eye of the beholder. It results from snap judgements
and intuition rather than a series of logical steps. Moreover, judgments are
subjective to the extent that the underlying moral or aesthetic norms are not
universally shared.
Any decision problem can in principle be placed on a spectrum of demonstra-
bility (Laughlin and Hollingshead, 1995; Laughlin and Shupe, 1996). Laughlin
and Ellis (1986) find that the degree of demonstrability significantly facilitates
agreement among decision group members. In the following we report the
first application of demonstrability to the sender-receiver game literature. Our
work also contributes to the demonstrability literature in that we examine it
in dyadic (rather than group) interactions with asymmetric information and
conflict of interest.
2.3 Difficulty
Most previous work assumes sender private information to be perfect, i.e.
known to be correct with certainty. Instead we consider situations where
private information is generated through imperfect sender decision making.
For example, in Pitchik and Schotter’s (1987) model of consumer advice,
an advisor’s competence is variable so that advice is incorrect with some
probability. In many other realistic scenarios the quality of private information
may be variable. Retailers and sales negotiators not involved in the production
process often have only partial knowledge regarding product specifications
and quality. Similarly, financial advisors cannot perfectly predict the future
performance of different investment products. In these cases the sender acquires
her private information through search subject to perception and processing
errors leading to imperfect information.
Sender advice therefore varies in quality depending on her competence and
the problem’s characteristics. We are interested here in the latter, the inherent
solvability of the problem itself. We define difficulty as the ex ante probabil-
ity that a randomly-chosen decision maker will identify the correct solution.
We examine whether increasing problem difficulty (and therefore decreasing
information quality) will lead to less persuasion in practice. In theory, unless
the situation is repeated (Golosov et al., 2014), any sender information qual-
ity is irrelevant to the game’s outcome since cheap talking senders have an
incentive to exaggerate (e.g. Chakraborty and Harbaugh, 2010). However, with
greater difficulty, senders may exploit private information less due to altruism,
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self consciousness, reputation or ethical principle creating a kind of curse of
knowledge (see Camerer et al., 1989, p. 1244). In this sense, talk is not cheap
because deception entails a psychic lying cost (Abeler et al., 2014).
3 An illustration: Venture capital
Venture capital illustrates how demonstrability and difficulty affect persua-
sion. Entrepreneurs identify business opportunities and solutions for their
exploitation that require funding from venture capitalists. This interaction
is characterised by both asymmetric information and misaligned interests:
Entrepreneurs have greater knowledge of the opportunity and the incentive to
maximise outside investment while venture capitalists lose from investing in
unsuccessful projects (Martens et al., 2007; Carpentier and Suret, 2015; van
Werven et al., 2015). Venture capitalists must glean useful information (and
disregard misinformation) from the entrepreneur’s storytelling or “pitching”
to persuade them (de Bettignies and Brander, 2007; Pollack and Bosse, 2014;
Martens et al., 2007; Herzenstein et al., 2011).
In terms of the illustration we examine whether investment depends on the
nature of the venture creation decision problem. Venture creation situations
differ both in how accurately business opportunities can be identified, assessed
and developed, and how easily their prospects can be demonstrated. On one
end of the demonstrability spectrum there are projects that can be evaluated
in a series of steps according to objective criteria such as sales forecasts or
technical feasibility studies for new products. In the pharmaceutical and natural
resource extraction industries, the prospects of particular projects can often
be ascertained and documented with reference to research (e.g. clinical trial
data and geophysical surveys).
On the other end, projects in the creative and aesthetic realms, such as
entertainment production or fashion, lack objective criteria but depend on
judgment to anticipate the subjective aesthetic evaluations of others. For
example, due to uncertain market and demand conditions, movie making
is increasingly financed by venture capital investment based on the vision
and competence of artistic entrepreneurs that determine success (DeFillippi
and Arthur, 1998). The combination of uncertain public reception and highly
specific individual competence make the prospects of movie projects hard to
demonstrate.
Consumer electronics represent an industry in the middle of the demonstrability
scale because of a mixture of technical performance features that can be
demonstrated, and aesthetic ones that cannot (e.g. Apple’s Power Mac G4
Cube, Linzmayer, 2004, p. 299). Another example is that of project-based
professional services (software, financial, legal and management consulting).
While performance criteria (such as previous sales and returns, courtroom
success or subsequent performance of the consulted firm) can be documented,
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Fig. 1. Schematic illustration of the experimental tasks in the three phases.
the idiosyncrasy of projects and the importance of individual personnel reduce
their cogency.
Venture creation projects also differ in terms of the difficulty of assessing
their prospects. Oil and gas exploration projects may be assessed more or less
easily depending on the nature and location of particular natural resource
deposits. New consumer product technology may involve either breakthrough or
marginal innovation. Artistic projects such as movies or music talent spotting
may uncover obvious and unequivocal or more risky prospects.
4 Experiment
We conducted an experiment to examine the effects of demonstrability and
difficulty on the persuasiveness of senders.
4.1 Phases
Participants completed experimental tasks in three phases (see Figure 1) where
the first two (A and B) serve as controls and preparation for the proper
measurement of persuasion in phase C.
In phase C (communication phase) each sender is matched with every receiver
for a total of 9 interactions using round-robin matching (every sender with
every receiver in the experimental session). In each such interaction the sender
is presented with a pair of images and asked to identify the correct one in
response to a true-or-false question. The sender then decides any part of 100
points to invest in her answer. The receiver observes the question the sender
must answer but not sender decision, the amount invested or the actual images
shown. Following the sender decisions there is a fixed period of unrestricted
2-way communication between sender and receiver. Next, the receiver decides
which part of a stake of 100 points to invest in the sender’s image answer. Note
in this design the decision problem is given only to the sender not the receiver,
unlike the Laughlin group decision studies. The payoffs for each sender and
each receiver respectively are their own uninvested points plus 1.5 times their
invested points if the sender’s image answer was correct. All invested points
are forfeited if the sender’s answer is incorrect. Both sender and receiver are
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also given the other’s earnings from the invested points. 2
Consider an illustration. The sender is shown the Mickey Mouse image pair in
figure 2 and answers the question, “Which is more black?” with the one on the
right, and then decides to invests 50 points. The sender then communicates
with the receiver who then invests 20 points in the sender’s answer which
turns out to be correct. The sender receives 50 + (50× 1.5) = 125 points from
her own decision plus an additional (20 × 1.5) = 30 based on the receiver’s
investment for a total of 155. The receiver earns 80 + (20× 1.5) = 110 from
his own decision plus 50 × 1.5 = 75 from the sender’s investment decision
for a total of 185. Had the sender’s answer been incorrect her earnings would
have been (50 + 50 × 0) + (20 × 0) = 50. The receiver would have earned
(80 + 20× 0) + (50× 0) = 80.
The logic of this task is as follows. Because the sender receives any earnings
the receiver makes from investing in the sender’s image answer, the sender
has an incentive to communicate so to persuade the receiver to invest the
maximum irrespective of the sender’s own confidence in her image answer.
The receiver (who cannot change the investment decision already made by
the sender) may benefit from communication only by correctly gleaning the
likelihood of a correct image answer from the sender and invest accordingly. 3
The receiver’s investment reflects, to an extent, the degree of persuasion.
Phase C was preceded by two additional phases (Figure 1): first, A (accus-
tomisation), followed by B (blind). Phase B proceeded in exactly the same
fashion as Phase C except that there was no possibility of communication.
Further there were only three image pairs, one of each type. The rationale for
Phase B is that receiver investment in Phase C may be motivated by factors
beyond communication with the sender, such as receiver risk appetite. Phase
B generates observations we use to control for these factors. In addition, there
was a Phase A in which both senders and receivers see and invest in 9 image
pairs and receive earnings only from their own decisions without any commu-
nication between them. The purpose was to allow senders as well as receivers
to familiarise themselves with the image tasks (and their own accuracy) before
performing investments in sender image decisions in phases B and C. Every
participant was shown different image pairs in every interaction in Phases A
and B which, as in Phase C, differed in terms of demonstrability as well as
difficulty. These pairs were also different to the ones shown in Phase C: No
participant saw the same image pair more than once in the experiment.
2 For senders this feature provides the incentive to pursuade. For receivers it has
been added in the interest of symmetry, i.e. to avoid potential effects on investment
decisions from envy or guilt arising from unequal opportunities for payoffs (e.g.
Kirchsteiger, 1994; Jordan et al., 2015).
3 The task is a mixed-motive (non-zero-sum) game to the extent that motives
increasignly overlap with the (uncertain) degree of sender accuracy.
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4.2 Treatments
Nine different image pairs were used in Phase C in a 3×3 design to manipulate
our two treatment variables demonstrability and difficulty are shown in Figure
2. Demonstrability was varied three ways using three kinds of image task
based on Laughlin (1980). For skill, the highest demonstrability condition,
we used perceptual discrimination tasks. Participants were asked to indicate
which of the two pure black and white images (one a colour inversion of the
other) had more black pixels. The answer is in principle demonstrable to the
extent that it can be derived by a series of operations (Laughlin, 1980), e.g.
by dividing the image into equal-sized squares and counting the balance of
black to white ones. For knowledge, our intermediate level of demonstrability,
we used a semantic memory task. Each of the two images showed a different
photograph of an iconic international landmark and participants were asked
which was in a particular country. So-called world knowledge problems such as
this lie in the middle of the demonstrability spectrum (Laughlin, 2011, pp. 93,
110). While there is a single true-or-false success criterion, the demonstrability
of correct answers here is limited by the extent to which senders can accurately
convey the contents of the two images, and their reasons for determining the
correct answer. An aesthetic evaluation task was used for the lowest level of
demonstrability (judgment). Two photographs of young people of the same
gender and ethnicity were presented, sourced from a public rating website. The
question was which was rated as more attractive on the site. This task is at
the judgment end of demonstrability spectrum as the consensus of an external
group of judges is considered least demonstrable (Laughlin, 1980). The 9 Phase
C image pairs were presented to every sender in the order indicated by the
numbered boxes in Figure 2. In all phases skill image pairs were shown first,
followed by knowledge and finally judgment to better reflect realistic scenarios.
This ordering as well as presenting receivers with the precise question (but
not the actual image pairs) senders were given means receivers were aware
of demonstrability. Receivers in real advisor persuasion situations (such as
sales pitches) ordinarily know demonstrability precisely because solutions are
sold to them. However this is not true for difficulty. Within each level of
demonstrability, there was no ordering of the three pairs by their difficulty. All
images in all phases were presented in the same order to every sender.
4.3 Procedure
We recruited 234 undergraduate student participants at a large UK university
from different faculties via class announcements and posters. Exactly half (117)
were male and the average age was 21.3 years. There were 13 sessions with
18 participants in each. Upon arrival, participants were equally and randomly
split between two separate laboratory rooms, one for senders and the other
for receivers. Laboratories were equipped with partitioned computer terminals
running z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) to present tasks, elicit responses, administer
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Fig. 2. The nine image pairs used as Phase C tasks in the 3× 3 design. The image
of a cartoon mouse that appeared to participants in pair 3 is not shown here for
copyright reasons.
comprehension quizzes and questionnaire responses, match participants, facili-
tate communication, provide feedback and calculate earnings. In particular,
communication between senders and receivers in phase C was an unrestricted
90 seconds of 2-way communication using z-Tree’s instant message feature
immediately after the sender investment decision. Sessions lasted around 90
minutes. We maintained a controlled experimental environment throughout
including privacy.
The three phases A, B and C proceeded in that order after consent form com-
pletion and general announcements. Every phase began with paper instructions
and a compulsory comprehension quiz and ended with individual feedback on
performance for each task in the phase. No feedback was given immediately
after each individual image tasks. We did not use deception in the experiment.
All payoff-relevant parts of the experiment including payment scheme were
made common knowledge among all participants. After phase C participants
completed a questionnaire with demographic questions. As the investment task
involves a dimension of risk we also elicited participants’ “willingness to take
risks, in general” on an eleven-point scale, a measure that has been shown to
predict experimental behaviour by Dohmen et al. (2011).
Participants knew that the experiment was conducted under conditions of
incentive compatibility, i.e. performance-related pay (e.g. Croson, 2005). At the
end of the session participant earnings were determined as the total number of
points earned over three tasks converted at the rate of £0.4 per 100 points plus
a flat participation fee of £10. On average participants were paid out around
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£23 (maximum: 27, minimum: 20) in cash delivered privately immediately
after the session. 4
4.4 Variables and hypotheses
Our experiment generated a dataset with observations concerning 1053 sender-
receiver games in phase C, i.e. 9 senders being matched with each of 9 receivers
in every one of 13 sessions. Experimental variables are shown in table 1. At
the level of each game, we observe whether the sender’s decision is accurate
(SACC=0 or 1), the time in seconds the image selection decision took (STIME),
the total points both sender and receiver invest (between 0 and 100) in the
sender’s image answer (SINV and RINV). SINV is an incentive-compatible
measure of the confidence a sender has in her decision. RINV is our main
dependent variable as it constitutes the target of sender persuasion attempts.
Because RINV in phase C reflects both the effect of communication and
receiver-specific motives to invest we derive a measure of persuasion (PERS)
as the difference between RINV in phase C and RINV in phase B (BLIND
RINV). The latter variable is, for a given interaction, the average of what the
sender concerned invested into images of the same image type in phase B. For
the same reason we use a dummy variable to indicate phase C (COMM=1 else
0). We also examined chat logs and recorded observations for 505 games where
senders made claims about SINV, the amount they invested (SCLAIM). 5 We
created ordinal variables for the difficulty treatment (DIFF=1 for easy, =2
for moderate and =3 for hard) as well as for demonstrability (DEMO=3 for
skill, =2 for knowledge and =1 for judgment). SKILL, KNOW and JUDGE
are separate dummy variables for each of these three levels of demonstrability.
The central proposition of this paper is that persuasion is positively related to
demonstrability, and negatively to difficulty. Our hypotheses for the relation-
ships between these variables are based on the following conceptual framework
(figure 3). Persuasion is the result of the interaction between sender and re-
ceiver based on the sender’s prior decision problem which is characterised by
demonstrability and difficulty. The sender’s confidence in her solution, proxied
by SINV results from difficulty of the decision problem alone and not its
demonstrability (H1).
Hypothesis 1 Difficulty has a negative effect on SINV, however, demon-
strability does not affect SINV.
In the subsequent interaction, communication from the sender results in per-
suasion of the receiver. One important component of the communication that
we measure is the amount the sender claims to have invested. While rational
and income maximising senders will exaggerate their own investments, this
4 At the time of the experiment £1 Sterling (GBP) traded at 1.51 USD.
5 In 12 of the 505 games senders under-claimed their investments, i.e.




Variable Phase Obs Mean Std Dev Min Max Range
Behavioural variables
SINV C 1053 72.59 29.5 0 100 {0 . . . 100}
STIME C 1050 8.98 6.1 0 20
SACC C 1053 0.79 0.4 0 1 {0,1}
SCLAIM C 505 79.15 26.9 0 100
RINV C 1053 66.84 34.3 0 100 {0 . . . 100}
BLIND RINV B 351 51.56 32.4 0 100 {0 . . . 100}
PERS B and C 1053 15.28 39.0 -100 100 {-100 . . . 100}
Treatment variables
COMM B and C 1404 0.75 0.4 0 1 {0,1}
DEMO C 1053 2.00 0.8 1 3 {1,2,3}
SKILL C 1053 0.33 0.5 0 1 {0,1}
KNOW C 1053 0.33 0.5 0 1 {0,1}
JUDGE C 1053 0.33 0.5 0 1 {0,1}
DIFF C 1053 2.00 0.8 1 3 {1,2,3}
Fig. 3. Conceptual model with experimental variables and research hypotheses.
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amount mirrors real investments to the extent that senders are honest (H2). A
sender with sufficiently strong aversion to lying or with pro-social preferences
may report SINV correctly. Difficulty therefore affects persuasion through
sender confidence and message. Note that because senders do not know their
own accuracy, SACC is not hypothesised to influence either SINV or SCLAIM.
Feedback was provided only after the task.
Hypothesis 2 SINV has a positive effect on SCLAIM.
RINV reflects persuasion in the extent to which a receiver’s investment deci-
sion is are influenced by senders’ cheap talk. A receiver’s decision to invest is
influenced by the sender’s claim (H3). Further, because receivers know demon-
strability independently, its level positively affects the receiver’s decision to
invest to the extent that receivers are reluctant to take solutions that cannot
be evidenced on trust (H4).
Hypothesis 3 SCLAIM has a positive effect on PERS.
Hypothesis 4 DEMO has a positive effect on PERS.
Finally, sender decision accuracy depends on difficulty but not demonstrability
(H5). Harder decision are less likely to a yield successful solution irrespective
of demonstrability which does not affect the sender’s ability to find it.
Hypothesis 5 DIFF, but not DEMO, has a negative effect on SACC.
5 Results
5.1 Participant Communication
Our hypotheses concern the effects of two main independent variables, DIFF
and DEMO, on persuasion. We begin by examining the text chat transcripts
for evidence that the difficulty of the senders’ decision problems and the
demonstrability of the correctness of their solutions indeed featured in the
persuasion process as expressed in their communications.
Senders and receivers each typically sent between 5 and 10 messages during
their 90-second exchange. Apart from banter, conversations were mostly infor-
mation exchange relevant to the task. Typically receivers asked questions that
senders responded to. These questions were mostly about task difficulty and
demonstrating solution correctness. For difficulty, most receivers asked senders
how difficult they thought the task was, how certain they were about their
answers and how much they invested. In terms of demonstrability, receivers
tended to ask about the images’ types, descriptions of the image particulars,
and the senders’ solution processes. Senders often described the images, how
they arrived at their solutions and what objective criteria they used.




Sender: I’m 100% sure I got it right :)
Sender: invest 100
Receiver: How certain were you of your answer
Receiver: how long did it take
Sender: Not lying haha I just want to get the money
Receiver: me too
Receiver: how long did it take
Sender: Not long, it was a politician
Receiver: great
Receiver: which one
Sender: and the background was black and his suit was black
Receiver: and his face
Sender: so only about 30% was white
Receiver: and arms




Sender: and thats it
Sender: the rest was black
Receiver: arms were white
Receiver: ?
Fig. 4. Text message exchange between two participants. The task is the Abraham
Lincoln pair shown in figure 2.
figure 4. After claiming complete confidence, the receiver deconstructs the image
of Abraham Lincoln into separate elements (background, suit), a procedure that
is continued by the receiver (face, arms) resulting in an overall estimation of the
black-white balance. As discussed, the determination of a solution using logical
steps (the number and size of different elements of a picture) is one aspect of
solution demonstrability. Other aspects of demonstrability were used for the
other image types. For example, many senders attempted to invoke objective
criteria to the low-demonstrability beauty task. These included resemblance to
famous people, blond hair and blue eyes and perceived health of the models
that senders judged more attractive.
It should be noted that there was considerable variation in both the length and
nature of sender-receiver exchanges, which exhibited these different persuasive
appeals and questions to different extents. However, we interpret these findings
to support that both difficulty and demonstrability were used by participants
in the persuasion process.
5.2 Regression Results
We now turn to the analysis of the data from the experiment. Summary statistics
for our variables are shown in table 1. The distributions of behavioural variables
over the experimental conditions are displayed in figure 5. Our focus is the
effect of demonstrability and difficulty on the persuasion process captured by
SACC, SINV, SCLAIM and RINV according to our hypotheses and conceptual
model (see figure 3).
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Fig. 5. Distribution of behavioural variables (as averages) over levels of demonstra-
bility (skill, knowledge and judgment) and difficulty (easy, moderate and hard).
We first analyse our data using a standard regression approach. Results are
presented in table 5.2. Because of repeated observations for individual partici-
pants we use a participant-level random-effects approach. We only use data
from phase C for all variables but BLIND RINV. We start by examining the
effect of difficulty on the sender’s decision (H 5). Regression model 1 supports
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Table 2
Regression results for SACC, SINV, SCLAIM and RINV. Standard errors in paren-
theses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
DV: SACC SACC SINV SINV SCLAIM SCLAIM RINV RINV RINV RINV RINV
DIFF -1.783∗∗∗ -1.784∗∗∗ -15.41∗∗∗ -15.41∗∗∗ -10.80∗∗∗ -0.00949 -10.59∗∗∗ -10.59∗∗∗ -3.968∗∗ -3.987∗∗ -3.879∗∗
(0.141) (0.141) (1.001) (1.001) (1.363) (1.043) (1.029) (1.024) (1.288) (1.281) (1.357)
DEMO -0.0991 -0.0991 1.721 0.456 -1.393 2.893∗∗ 3.201∗∗ 3.176∗∗
(0.105) (0.105) (1.001) (1.353) (0.936) (1.029) (1.201) (1.212)
SESSION 0.00682
(0.00982)
KNOW 2.276 8.704∗∗∗ 7.884∗∗
(2.003) (2.047) (2.437)




BLIND RINV 0.429∗∗∗ 0.429∗∗∗ 0.461∗∗∗ 0.458∗∗∗ 0.461∗∗∗
(0.0642) (0.0642) (0.0836) (0.0842) (0.0821)
SCLAIM 0.663∗∗∗ 0.657∗∗∗ 0.655∗∗∗
(0.0414) (0.0413) (0.0602)
Constant 5.648∗∗∗ 5.553∗∗∗ 99.98∗∗∗ 101.5∗∗∗ 99.83∗∗∗ 34.68∗∗∗ 60.10∗∗∗ 61.05∗∗∗ -10.71 -8.222 -10.94
(0.435) (0.454) (2.955) (2.463) (4.031) (3.896) (4.706) (4.390) (7.018) (6.739) (7.063)
N 1053 1053 1053 1053 505 505 1053 1053 505 505 505
ll -420.6 -420.4
χ2 160.3 160.5 240.1 240.0 62.94 697.9 158.5 170.4 384.5 392.2 384.0
R2 0.185 0.185 0.110 0.582 0.172 0.178 0.438 0.442 0.438
this hypothesis in that more difficult images significantly cause less accurate
sender decisions that while demonstrability had no effect on accuracy. Model 2
includes an index for the timing of the experimental session to test whether
participant collusion between sessions could have affected their ability to solve
the image tasks. This variable is insignificant suggesting there was no effect
of collusion on accuracy. Similar to model 1, in model 3 where SINV is the
dependent variable, difficulty but not demonstrability is a significant influence,
supporting H1. Model 4 further supports the insignificance of demonstrability
by replacing this variable with dummies for the knowledge and skill tasks,
where judgment is the baseline. Neither of these coefficients is significant.
Models 5 and 6 examine effects on sender claims (SCLAIM). Again demon-
strability is not significant. In support of H2, SINV is a significant explanator
when added in model 6. Senders are honest to the extent that their claims are
tempered by what they really invested. Difficulty becomes insignificant when
SINV is added because the influence of difficulty operates indirectly through
sender confidence.
Models 7 to 11 focus on the major issue, the effect of difficulty and demon-
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strability on persuasion, proxied by RINV. 6 The diagrams in figure 5 for
PERS and RINV (bottom panel) suggest that persuasion falls with difficulty.
They also suggest that persuasion falls when we compare skill with judgment,
the highest and lowest levels of demonstrability. Averaged over all levels of
difficulty, both average PERS and RINV are higher for skill (16.2 and 67.8)
than judgment (10.4 and 62.0). To examine these effects we regress persuasion
proxied by RINV on difficulty and demonstrability using BLIND RINV as a
control for effects on receiver investment other than communication. Difficulty
is negative and significant throughout: Harder tasks reduce persuasion. Model
7 shows that demonstrability is significant supporting H4.
While Laughlin and colleagues propose demonstrability changes along a spec-
trum (Laughlin and Hollingshead, 1995; Laughlin and Shupe, 1996), it is clear
that such a spectrum, if it exists, would be ordinal rather than continuous in
nature to the extent that skill, judgment and knowledge tasks are different in
kind rather than merely in degree. We therefore examine whether the effect
of demonstrability holds when we examine these three separately. In model
8 we again replace demonstrability with dummies for skill and knowledge.
It reveals that beyond the lowest level of demonstrability (judgment), both
skill and knowledge tasks raise persuasion. Further regressions (not reported)
reveal that when one of these two lower demonstrability levels is used as a
baseline, the other is insignificant suggesting there is no effect on persuasion as
demonstrability is raised or lowered from skill to knowledge. Demonstrability
therefore affects persuasion even if treated as a categorical variable.
We hypothesise that while demonstrability affects persuasion directly (H4),
difficulty does so via the sender’s message (H3). We examine this in models 9
to 11. SCLAIM is significant throughout, supporting H3. Difficulty remains
significant, perhaps because this variable was communicated by senders in
other ways rather than through claims about their own investments. Model
10 again replaces demonstrability with knowledge and skill, both of which are
significant. 7 In model 11 SINV is insignificant when added suggesting sender
confidence variable does not have an effect on persuasion independently of
SCLAIM. This suggests difficulty reduces persuasion mainly through senders’
expressed messages rather than inability to persuade though lacking confidence.
Social preferences and resulting lying costs provide a possible explanation.
6 As a robustness test we re-estimated these models using PERS as the dependent
variable without the control for BLIND RINV. The results we obtained were, in
terms of variable significance, the same.
7 An F -test reveals no significant difference between the coefficients of knowledge
and skill (p=0.526).
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Fig. 6. Maximum likelihood estimation of the conceptual model.
5.3 SEM Results
In the interest of result robustness we also tested the hypothesised model of
figure 3 by applying a covariance-based structural equation modelling approach
(CB-SEM), using AMOS 24. The results are presented in figure 6. Again we
use only data from phase C for all variables bar BLIND RINV.
The fit of our hypothesised model was excellent (χ2/df = 1,733; confirmatory fit
index [CFI] = .998; Tucker-Lewis index [TLI] = .993; root mean squared error
of approximation [RMSEA] = .026). As for the structural model, the effect
of sender’s perceived difficulty on sender’s investment (SINV) is negative and
significant (-.15, p < .01). However, the level of demonstrability does not affect
SINV, thereby fully confirming H1. As for H2, we found that SINV positively
and significantly relates to SCLAIM (.75; p < .001), thereby indicating that
senders are honest to the extent that their claims are tempered by what they
really invested. In contrast and as expected, DEMO has no significant effect
on SCLAIM, thereby fully confirming H2. In H3, we hypothesised that a
sender’s claim has a positive effect on the receiver’s persuasion (PERS). The
effect is positive, strong and significant (.51; p < .001), thereby supporting
H3. In addition, we also tested whether difficulty and SINV have direct effects
on PERS, however, both relationships are non-significant. In conclusion, our
results indicate that the negative effect of difficulty on PERS is fully mediated
by both SINV and SCLAIM. In addition to difficulty, we hypothesised that
demonstrability has a direct and positive effect of PERS. In accordance with
H4, we find that demonstrability positively and significantly affects PERS
(.07; p < .05). As further hypothesised, the effect of demonstrability on SINV
and SCLAIM is non-significant, thereby fully confirming H4. As pertaining
to H5, we conducted a logistic regression, finding that more difficult images
significantly cause less accurate sender decisions, while demonstrability had no
effect on accuracy (SACC). These results fully confirm H5.
In conclusion, our empirical results from both types of analysis confirm all
of our hypotheses. Overall they show that both task difficulty and demon-
strability have an independent effect on the persuasion of the receiver of the
message. The negative effect of difficulty on persuasion is fully mediated by the
17
communication process between the sender and the receiver, while the effect
of demonstrability relates directly and positively to sender’s persuasion.
6 Discussion
Our results support the general idea that diverging interests impede the trans-
mission of private information (Crawford and Sobel, 1982), an important source
of market efficiency in the economy (Hayek, 1945). 8 We contribute a further in-
sight to this: Private information transmission depends on the problem solving
that generated it. In our sender-receiver experiment, solution demonstrabil-
ity and difficulty independently affect persuasion. Difficulty reduces receiver
investment due to sender unwillingness to conceal it, thereby reducing their
perceived expertise. Lacking demonstrability lowers receiver investments even
when difficulty and sender confidence are controlled. Ceteris paribus, receivers
are more cautious when decision problems lack objective success criteria. In
contrast, under common knowledge of rationality, senders have no incentive to
reveal difficulty, which affects solution accuracy. Rational receivers have none
to act on lacking demonstrability, which does not.
One implication is that the information transmission problem is particularly
true for industries where product performance is more subjective or difficult to
ascertain. Another, more practical one is the existence of a curse of knowledge
in selling: Senders tend to signal lacking expertise from decision difficulty that
will negatively affect their persuasiveness (e.g. McGinnies and Ward, 1980).
We believe that this new perspective harbours potential for more insight into
the relationship between advisor decision problems and persuasion. Future
research could further develop the concept of demonstrability and vary it in
more fine-grained experimental designs and explore how it interacts with other
decision problem characteristics such as difficulty.
8 Our senders’ overall accuracy of 78.9% means receivers (and therefore senders)
could have made significantly higher gains had they invested more than their average
66.8% of points per game. Payoff-maximising, risk-neutral receivers should invest all
100 points if SACC> 23 , i.e. if the marginal return of a point invested (1.5×SACC)
is greater than 1.
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